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There is an extensive bibliography devoted to the problem of mi-racles.1 It is not our goal to analyze those works, particularly as 
they offer diverse definitions of miracles depending on the accepted 
conceptual scheme, such as Aristotelian ontology. Our goal is less 
ambitious: by adopting two explications of the notion of a miracle, 
we shall try to answer the question of how the knowledge concerning 
miraculous events may be embedded into one’s belief system. In par-
ticular, we shall be interested in uncovering the logical mechanisms 
at work in this process.
1. Introduction
Simplifying considerably, one can argue that miracles are events 
which are contrary to the common course of nature (communum cur-
sus naturae). Medieval philosophers posited that one should distin-
* This contribution was made possible through the support of a grant “The Limits of 
Scientific Explanation” from the John Templeton Foundation.
1 Cf. e.g. J.T. Driscoll, Miracle, [in:] The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 10, Robert 
Appleton Company, New York 1911, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10338a.htm 
(30 March 2010).
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guish between two orders: so-called ordo naturalis or natural order, 
which is fully penetrable by human reason, and ordo supranaturalis 
vel miraculis, or the supernatural order, which can be known only 
through revelation. From this perspective, miracles – belonging to 
the supernatural order – are phenomena which cannot be accounted 
for with the use of natural reason.2
This understanding of miracles leads us to an important contro-
versy. One should ask whether miracles are contrary to the principles 
governing the universe, or whether they strike us as contrary to the 
physical laws, but it is just a result of our ignorance. The answer to 
this question hangs together with how one understands the status of 
ordo naturalis and ordo supranaturalis: are they ontological concepts 
or only epistemological ones. According to the former interpretation, 
ordo naturalis is a set of laws governing the universe, and as a result, 
a miracle constitutes a violation of those laws. On the latter reading, 
the distinction between the two ordines coincides with the distinction 
between what can potentially be known through natural reason (ordo 
naturalis) and what reason cannot grasp (ordo supranaturalis). Thus, 
a miracle would be an event which complies with the laws governing 
the universe, but such laws which human reason cannot comprehend 
naturally.
The declarations of the Doctors of the Church pertaining to this 
problem are ambiguous. Augustine claims that miracles are not con-
trary to nature, but only contrary to what we know about nature. He 
says:
So great an author as Varro would certainly not have called this 
a portent had it not seemed to be contrary to nature. For we say that 
all portents are contrary to nature; but they are not so. For how is 
that contrary to nature which happens by the will of God, since the will 
of so mighty a Creator is certainly the nature of each created thing? 
2 Cf. B. Brożek, The Double Truth Controversy, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków, 
2010, Chapter 1.4.
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A portent, therefore, happens not contrary to nature, but contrary to 
what we know as nature.3
On the other hand, Aquinas observes in Summa Theologica that mira-
cles lie outside of the natural order or “are done outside the order of 
nature”.4 The declaration of Augustine may be interpreted as a confir-
mation of the epistemological theory of miracles: a miracle is an event 
which is contrary to our knowledge of the universe (or, more precise-
ly, contrary to what we can potentially know about it). The stance of 
Aquinas seems to support the ontological interpretation: a miracle is 
an occurrence contrary to the laws governing the universe. 
It is not our goal to answer the question of which of these in-
terpretations is correct. We assume that both options are interesting 
from a logical point of view. Before we proceed with further analysis, 
however, one more distinction is needed. It seems that one can speak 
of two kinds of miracles. The first category involves the unrepeatable 
miracles, that is such that constitute unique events, e.g. when Lazarus 
was raised from the grave. The second category comprises the repeat-
able miracles, an example being the Eucharistic transubstantiation. 
Such repeatable miracles can be captured by a general ‘law’ (e.g. 
each time wine and bread are consecrated during a holy Mass, they 
become the blood and body of Christ).
The question we venture to answer is: what is the formal struc-
ture of theological knowledge if it allows the existence of miracles? 
In order to carry out our analysis, let us formulate the following two 
examples:
Example 1: a repeatable miracle. According to Aristotle, there are 
two kinds of entities: substances, which exist simpliciter (per se), and 
accidents, which exist secundum quid or in substances. It is not pos-
sible for an accident to exist per se. Thus, it is impossible to explain 
3 Augustine, The City of God, Book XXI, Chapter 8.
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I:110:4.
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what happens during transubstantiation. The teaching of the Catho-
lic Church is that after transubstantiation the accidents of bread and 
wine exist – miraculously – without an underlying substance.
Let us formalize this example in the first order logic.5 Let ACC 
stand for ‘is an accident’, DEP – ‘is dependent in its existence’, SUB 
– ‘is a substance’, IND – ‘is independent in its existence’, and HOS 
– ‘is an accident of bread after transubstantiation.’ Thus, we get:
(1) ∀x (ACC(x) → DEP(x)) premise (natural reason)
(2) ∀x (SUB(x) → IND(x)) premise (natural reason)
(3) ∀x (IND(x) ≡ ¬DEP(x))  definition
(4) ∀x (HOS(x) → IND(x)) premise (faith)
(5) ∀x (HOS(x) → ACC(x)) premise (natural reason)
Example 2: an unrepeatable miracle. It is impossible to raise a dead 
man from his grave. However, Lazarus was raised from his grave in 
a miraculous way. 
Let us assume that MOR stands for ‘is dead’, and RES – ‘to be 
resurrected’, while l is an individual constant (a proper name) for 
Lazarus. We get:
(i) ∀x (MOR(x) → ¬RES(x)) premise (natural reason)
(ii) MOR(l)
(iii) RES(l)
2. Epistemological understanding of miracles
Let us assume, first of all, that miracles should be understood 
epistemologically and look from this perspective at the repeatable 
5 We formalize this example in the first order logic, which may seem incorrect since 
we use individual variables to refer to both accidents and substances. It would be more 
natural to use the second order logic. At the price of gross simplification, we have de-
cided to utilize the first order logic, which is sufficient for our goals.
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miracles as depicted in Example 1. Let h stand for the accident of 
some particular bread after transubstantiation:
(6) HOS(h) premise
Based on the premises (1)-(6), we may conclude that:
(7) IND(h)  from (4) and (6)
(8) ACC(h)  from (5) and (6)
(9) DEP(h)  from (1) and (8)
(10) ¬DEP(h)  from (4) and (7)
Thus, we obtain a contradiction. A way to avoid it is to take into ac-
count a piece of information which comes from revelation, namely 
that the accidents of bread after transubstantiation exist independent-
ly in a miraculous way. This knowledge must be incorporated into the 
general law based on natural reason, according to which accidents 
have no independent existence. Thus, we must modify the premise 
(1) in the following way:
(1)∗ ∀x ((ACC(x) ∧ ¬HOS(x))→ DEP(x))
Under those new circumstances, it is impossible to derive (9) as it 
is not true that ¬HOSh. Let us note that such a reformulation of the 
premise (1) complies with the epistemological understanding of mir-
acles. A miracle – in our case, the independent existence of the acci-
dents of bread after transubstantiation – is not something contrary to 
the laws of nature, but rather incompatible with what we know about 
those laws. To put it differently: the revealed truth pertaining to the 
independent existence of the accidents of bread after transubstantia-
tion constitutes a piece of information about the laws governing the 
world, and so it must be incorporated into the general law expressed 
in the premise (1).
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It may be added that in a similar way – through the incorporation 
of exceptions – the knowledge based on the natural reason alone is ex-
panded. Let us consider a general law expressed in the following way:
(P) ∀x (R(x) → S(x))
Let us assume further that we have observed an exception to this rule 
such that for any x, which is R but also T, x is not S. In such a case, 
one needs to revise the law (P):
(P*) ∀x ((R(x) ∧ ¬Τ(x)) → S(x))
This type of revision is an example of the concretization of a law of 
physics, i.e. dispensing with some idealizing assumption of that law.
The situation is different in the case of unrepeatable miracles. In 
our example:
(i) ∀x (MOR(x) → ¬RES(x)) premise (natural reason)
(ii) MOR(l)
(iii) RES(l)
The contradiction is easy to spot since the premises (i) and (ii), through 
the elimination of the universal quantifier and modus ponens, yield:
(iv) ¬RES(l)
An attempt to take advantage of the strategy of incorporating excep-
tions into the general law results, in this case, in the following modi-
fication of the premise (i):
(i)* ∀x ((MOR(x) ∧ ¬x=l) → ¬RES(x))
This modification is unfortunate as it requires for each and every 
occurrence of an unrepeatable miracle which contradicts the law ex-
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pressed in (i) the introduction of a clause ‘∧¬x=n’, where n is an 
individual constant, i.e. a proper name of an object which does not 
submit to the law (i). This manoeuvre leads to fatal consequences: 
our knowledge is no longer universal, but becomes ‘casuistic’. Such 
laws as the one expressed in (i)* are not algorithmically compress-
ible.6 Moreover, the exceptions in the form ‘∧¬x=n’ are purely re-
dundant in any system of knowledge: they are always formulated ex 
post factum and serve no role in the prediction of future events.
The situation changes little when one – instead of modifying 
(i) by introducing clauses in the form of ‘∧¬x=N’ – opts for the fol-
lowing solution:
(i)** ∀x ((MOR(x) ∧ ¬MIR(x)) → ¬RES(x))
where MIR stands for ‘is subject to a miraculous event’. In order to 
make inferences on the basis of (i)** one would need to confirm first 
that the given object x is not subject to a miraculous event, while this 
may be stated only ex post.
The above-presented analysis shows that – on the epistemological 
interpretation of miracles – only repeatable miracles may be reason-
ably incorporated into one’s web of beliefs. Unrepeatable miracles, 
on the other hand, are anomalies, which – introduced into our knowl-
edge – constitute redundant information. It must be noted, however, 
that since the mechanism of incorporating ‘repeatable miracles’ into 
our knowledge is – from the logical point of view – the same as the 
mechanism of concretizing the laws of physics, the distinction be-
tween ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ exceptions is always based on an 
extra-logical criterion. Indeed, as our example clearly shows, repeat-
able miracles are always non-empirical (they cannot be observed). 
If they were observable, they would be indistinguishable from other 
– natural – phenomena, which are in conflict with some general law.
6 Cf. M. Heller, Czy świat jest matematyczny?, [in:] Filozofia i Wszechświat, Univer-
sitas, Kraków 2006, p. 51.
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3. Ontological understanding of miracles
In the case of the ontological interpretation of miracles, the solu-
tion outlined above, i.e. that exceptions constituted by miraculous 
events should be incorporated into the formulation of general law, 
is unacceptable, since our goal is for our knowledge to mimic the 
structure of the universe (it should describe the laws governing the 
reality). Thus, in our Example 1, the premise (1) should be preserved 
in the form:
(1) ∀x (ACC(x) → DEP(x))
The problem here is that – together with the premises (2)-(6) – the 
premise (1) yields a contradiction. The only way out of this trouble 
is to abandon classical logic and admit that the existence of ontologi-
cally understood miracles forces one to express the laws depicting 
the structure of the universe in the so-called defeasible logic.7 
Such defeasible logic (let us call it DL) operates at two levels. 
On the first level, from the given set of premises one constructs argu-
ments; on the second level, the arguments are compared in order to 
decide which of them prevails. The conclusion of the prevailing argu-
ment is also the conclusion of the entire set of premises.
The language of DL is the language of the first order logic ex-
tended by the addition of a new connective, the so-called defeasible 
implication ⇒. For the defeasible implication, there is a special infer-
ence rule of defeasible modus ponens:
A⇒B
A
–––––
B
7 Cf. H. Prakken, Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument, Kluwer, Dordrecht 
1997; B. Brożek, Defeasibility of Legal Reasoning, Zakamycze, Kraków 2004.
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The difference between the material and defeasible implications is 
visible only at the second level of DL.
The language of DL serves to construct arguments. Let us have 
a look at the following example:
(a) A ⇒ B
(b) C ⇒ ¬B
(c) A
This set of premises may serve us to construct the following argument:
(ARG1)
 (a) A ⇒ B
 (c) A
 –––––––––
 (d) B
Let us extend our set of premises by adding the following sentence:
(e) C
Now, we can construct another argument:
(ARG2)
 (b) C ⇒ ¬B
 (e) C
 ––––––––––
 (f) ¬B
Given two such arguments, we can move onto the second level of 
DL, where we decide which of the sentences – B or ¬B – should be 
the conclusion of our extended set of premises.
On the second level of DL, two concepts play a key role: attack 
and defeat. Simplifying considerably, one can say that an argument 
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ARGA attacks an argument ARGB, when the conclusions of both argu-
ments are contradictory. This is the case in our example, where B and 
¬B are contradictory, and thus (ARG1) attacks (ARG2). When two 
arguments attack each other, it must be decided which of them pre-
vails, or defeats, the other. There are many possible ways of compar-
ing arguments. The easiest and most flexible is to assume that there 
is an externally (extra-logically) given ordering of defeasible impli-
cations. One checks what the defeasible implications that served to 
construct the two competing arguments are and declares that the one 
which prevails is that whose defeasible implication is higher in the 
ordering. In our example, the first argument is constructed with the 
use of the implication A⇒B, and the second: C⇒¬B. Let us assume 
that the second implication is higher in the ordering. If so, it is the 
second argument that prevails in the comparison with the first one, 
and it is its conclusion, ¬B, which becomes the conclusion of our 
extended set of premises.8 Let us assume further that the arguments 
which are constructed based on no defeasible implications always 
prevail in comparison with arguments constructed with the use of 
some defeasible implications. 
Let us now apply this simple idea to our Example 1, replacing 
all material implications which appear in the premises expressing the 
laws of natural reason with their defeasible counterparts:
(1) ACC(x) => DEP(x)
(2) SUB(x) => IND(x)
(3) ∀x (IND(x) ≡ ¬DEP(x))
(4) ∀x (HOS(x) → IND(x))
(5) HOS(x) => ACC(x)
(6) HOSh
Those premises may serve to construct the following two argu-
ments:
8 Thus, DL is a non-monotonic logic.
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(ARG3)
 (6) HOS(h)
 (4) ∀x (HOS(x) → IND(x))
 (7) IND(h)  from (4) and (6)
 (3) ∀x (IND(x) ≡ ¬DEP(x))
 (10) ¬DEP(h)  from (3) and (7)
(ARG4)
 (6) HOS(h)
 (5) HOS(x) => ACC(x)
 (8) ACC(h)  from (5) and (6)
 (1) ACC(x) => DEP(x)
 (9) DEP(h)  from (1) and (8)
The arguments attack each other, since their conclusions are contra-
dictory. In this particular case, it is (ARG3) that prevails as it takes 
advantage of no defeasible implication, when (ARG4) uses two such 
implications. The logical conclusion of our entire set of premises is 
then:
(10) ¬DEP(h)
Example 2 may be formalized in a similar way:
(i) ∀x (MOR(x) => ¬RES(x)) premise (natural reason)
(ii) MOR(l)
(iii) RES(l)
On the basis of these premises, one can construct two arguments:
(ARG5) 
 (iii) RES(l)
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(ARG6)
(i) MOR(x) => ¬RES(x)
(ii) MOR(l)
(iv) ¬RES(l)
Again, we have a conflict of arguments. In this case, it is argument 
(ARG5) that prevails since it takes advantage of no defeasible impli-
cation. Thus, the logical conclusion of the entire set of premises is:
(iii) RES(l)
This formalization is satisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, it ena-
bles one to preserve the form of the laws of nature: one does not need 
to introduce any exceptions into the formulation of a law of nature, 
which is in compliance with the ontological understanding of mira-
cles. Secondly, within the defeasible logic one can identify a logical 
(formal) difference between our knowledge of miracles and our sci-
entific knowledge. In the former case, a miraculous event ‘blocks’ 
the application of a general law of natural reason; in the latter – when 
a phenomenon is observed which is incompatible with some general 
law – one can revise the law by introducing an exception or through 
some more complex modifications. 
An important drawback of the present solution is that the defea-
sible logic described above does not have a traditionally understood 
semantics. Instead, it is based on the so-called argument-based se-
mantics, in which the concepts of attack and defeat play the crucial 
role. However, there is no (logical) interpretation in the traditional 
sense here, and defeasible implications are ascribed no truth values.
Such an approach is uncontroversial in the context of the medi-
eval debates pertaining to miracles (or to natural and supernatural 
orders). Medieval philosophers deemed the laws discovered by the 
natural reason probabiles. This concept of probabilitas should not 
be understood, however, in the contemporary sense of ‘probability’, 
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but rather as expressing that something ‘can be proved’, ‘is justified’ 
or ‘is with arguments in its favour’.9 With such an understanding of 
the epistemic status of the laws discovered by the natural reason, 
the defeasible logic equipped with the argument-based semantics is 
a perfect tool for rendering the medieval intuitions.
From today’s perspective, however, a different solution is needed. 
One option is to take advantage of the intentional semantics for defeasi-
ble logic.10 An inspiration for this type of formal structure is the seman-
tics for counterfactual conditionals. Such a counterfactual conditional 
as P → Q is true in an actual world if and only if in a subset of possible 
worlds Z, which are ‘the most similar to the actual world’, Q is true in 
all those worlds belonging to Z in which P is true. Defeasible implica-
tions may be treated similarly. A defeasible implication, say P => S, 
is true if in a subset of possible worlds N, which are ‘the most normal 
worlds’, S is true in each world belonging to N in which P is true. 
Thus, one of our defeasible implications, (i) MOR(x) => ¬RES(x), 
is true if for every x, ¬RES(x) is true in every most normal world in 
which MOR(x) is true. 
Let us observe that the actual world does not have to be one of 
'the most normal worlds'. In order to make inferences on the basis 
of a defeasible implication such as (i) MOR(x) => ¬RES(x), we as-
sume that it is a most normal world. However, if a miraculous event 
occurs in the actual world, our assumption is undermined and we are 
no longer entitled to reason with the use of (i). In such a semantics, 
considerable controversy is connected to the way of determining the 
set N (of the most normal worlds). This, however, is an extra-logical 
problem. To put it simply: N is a set of those worlds in which the laws 
of the natural order are always fulfilled. The most normal worlds are 
the worlds in which there are no miracles.
9 Cf. B. Brożek, The Double Truth Controversy, op. cit., Chapter I.
10 Cf. H. Prakken, G. Vreeswijk, Logical Systems for Defeasible Argumentation, [in:] 
D. Gabbay (ed.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd edition, vol. IV, Kluwer, Dor-
drecht 2002, p. 219-318.
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It turns out that the ontologically understood miracles are easier 
to model logically than miracles understood epistemologically. The 
use of defeasible logic makes it possible to account for both repeat-
able and unrepeatable miracles. This is achieved at the price of aban-
doning the classical logic, which is an interesting consequence of 
accepting the ontological interpretation of miraculous events.
4. Summary
The problem which we have analysed above constitutes an aspect 
of a broader controversy, namely the question pertaining to the pos-
sibility of God’s intervention in the course of events. Contemporary 
theology – and especially its strands inspired by the development of 
the natural sciences – makes a number of attempts designed to show 
that God’s intervention in the world is possible without violating the 
laws of physics. Some see a place for this in the probabilistic charac-
ter of the laws of quantum mechanics. Others regard such proposals 
as a subtler version of the ‘God of the gaps’ argument and opt for an 
alternative solution. Józef Życiński observes:
Instead of God hidden in Heisenberg’s uncertainty, or expressed in 
the so-called physical chaos, we propose a model, in which the role 
of God immanent in cosmic history is contained in laws of nature as 
well as in what we metaphorically call the ‘boundary conditions.’ The 
expression denotes theologically conceived boundary conditions in 
which non-physical (i.e. biological, psychic, spiritual) factors are also 
taken into consideration in a system considered ‘from God’s point of 
view’ (again metaphor).11
It must be stressed that both formal explications of miracles we have 
presented are incompatible with the understanding of God’s imma-
11 J. Życiński, The Laws of Nature and the Immanence of God in the Evolving Uni-
verse, “Studies in Science and Theology” 1997, vol. 5, p. 15.
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nence in the world as outlined by Życiński. On both interpretations 
of miracles – epistemological and ontological – miracles remain phe-
nomena which cannot be explained by science. This is incompatible 
with methodological reductionism, which constitutes the backbone 
of modern science: there are no such observable facts which a priori 
may be deemed inexplicable by science. Such aprioricity is directly 
related to miracles understood ontologically, where the natural or-
der is ontologically different from the supernatural order. There is no 
such difference within the epistemological interpretation of miracles. 
Thus, one may postulate a reformulation of the epistemological con-
cept such that it would comply with the reductionist strategy of sci-
ence. However, this would lead to the rejection of such revisions of 
the laws of nature which introduce redundant information, as e.g. re-
placing (i)* ∀x(MOR(x) → ¬RES(x)) with (i)* ∀x((MOR(x) ∧ ¬x=l) 
→ ¬RES(x)). On this new account, miracles would be ‘naturalized’, 
and the goal of science would remain to formulate general laws which 
explain – through ‘natural causes’ – why Lazarus was raised from the 
grave or why in Cana the water was turned into wine. The question is, 
however, whether we are still speaking of miracles in this case.
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